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Archaeologists evince a strong tendency to impute signiﬁcance to the material traces they
study, a propensity that has been especially marked since the post-processual emphasis on
meaning and that has taken on renewed vigour with the turn to materiality. But are there
not situations in which things are rather incidental or insigniﬁcant? This set of essays
emerged from a workshop held in Berlin in April 2018, in which a group of scholars
was invited to discuss the place of the incidental in social life in general and in
archaeology in particular. Rather than lengthy formal papers, we offer an introduction
that presents a general set of reﬂections on the issue of the incidentalness of things,
followed by essays that pursue particular directions raised by that introduction as well
as our discussions in Berlin. It is our hope that these brief forays into a complex topic
will stimulate further work on this subject.
Introduction
‘If there was one blade of grass you know what would
have happened, you would have eaten it’—this was the
ﬁrst thought of former Auschwitz prisoner Kitty Hart
when she revisited the erstwhile concentration camp and
saw the green grounds. Tourists, on the other hand, do
not notice the grass as anything special: it is a green back-
ground typical for memorial sites and parks. This extreme
example shows that the material world can evoke vastly
different meanings and expectations, from considerations
of existential importance to total obliviousness.
Archaeology as ‘the discipline of things’ (Olsen et al.
2012) seems to be particularly well placed to investigate
such questions. Reading recent contributions to the arch-
aeological literature and philosophical works on which
they draw could encourage us to view the material world
of which we are part as one of enormous signiﬁcance.
However, traditional archaeologists have also acted as
though even broken fragments of the most mundane arte-
facts are of major import.
The workshop from which this set of papers emerged
had its genesis in discussions among several of the authors
on positionality and shifting relations between things and
identities within the framework of the ‘ontological turn’
and new materialisms in archaeology. These took place in
the framework of informal discussions concerning the
implications of an emerging archaeology of Nazi times in
Germany as well as the problems of massive quantities of
archaeological ﬁnds, especially but by no means exclu-
sively from excavations of sites of modernity (e.g.
Hofmann et al. 2016). In particular, it seemed to us that
an issue of substantial importance that has been left aside
in many of these discussions of otherwise fundamental
principles is whether things—however exactly we deﬁne
them—invariably have meaning or other kinds of
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signiﬁcance for people. But are there not also situations in
which they are incidental or insigniﬁcant? And, if so, what
kinds of situations would call forth incidentalness? And for
whom? We can best recognize incidentalness, often related
to the quotidian, by reﬂecting on its opposite, such as the
circumstances of extreme cruelty and inhumanity in
which inmates of Nazi concentration camps found them-
selves. There, things take on very different qualities—as
Kitty Hart remarks, they are almost never insigniﬁcant
for those conﬁned there. In other words, in our theoretical
musings we must take into consideration those situations
that contrast with more ‘normal’ ones, in which many
things do indeed seem to fall into the realm of the inciden-
tal, inconsequential and casual.
Our intent with this introductory paper is not to offer
a programmatic statement, but rather to open a discussion
on the incidentalness of the thingly world. We raise a
variety of issues and point in certain directions, suggesting
potential avenues and posing questions, rather than
providing deﬁnitive answers or charting a clear path
forward.
Conceptualization and problems of translation
In looking for inspiration on how to conceptualize these
issues, we turned in the ﬁrst instance to the work of
Martin Heidegger on Zeug as zuhanden (‘ready-to-hand’)1
and to Hans Peter Hahn’s writings on material culture
and the Eigensinn of things (Hahn 2014; 2015). It was in
the latter that we found discussions about Beiläuﬁgkeit
that seemed to us to be on the mark.
With it, however, we encountered a ﬁrst signiﬁcant
problem, that of translation: there is no single satisfactory
English term that captures the meaning of Beiläuﬁgkeit.2
We have translated it for present purposes as ‘incidental-
ness’—not a very elegant word in English—but it encom-
passes a semantic ﬁeld that includes not only notions of
the incidental, but also casual(ness), inconsequentiality,
that which is parenthetic, ‘by the way’, and apparently
insigniﬁcant. The phrase ‘by the way’ incorporates an
important element of the German term, where bei- implies
a vague notion of ‘next to’ without any speciﬁc direction,
distance, or quality of distance between two entities; laufen,
to walk, suggests a spatial relation of unspeciﬁc distance
and a sort of ‘moving non-target’. In daily language,
Beiläuﬁgkeit denotes something that barely makes it into
our consciousness, if at all.
To plumb the depths of complex terminologies and
concepts, it is often useful to think in pairs of oppositions
and not just in synonyms. However, the search for an
opposite of Beiläuﬁgkeit also proves difﬁcult. One can
think of words denoting fullness or heaviness, conjuring
up in the reverse a certain lightness and emptiness that sur-
rounds the Beiläuﬁge. Attentiveness, amazement, astonish-
ment, caring, focusing, framing and spotlighting also
capture elements of the opposite meaning. Beiläuﬁgkeit
not only denotes something vague, dynamic and barely
perceived: the word itself avoids speciﬁcity.
This may be one of the reasons for Heidegger’s choice
of the term Zeug in Being and Time. Zeug is derived from the
propensity of the German language to hang substantives
onto each other in a substantivist way of thinking:
Nähzeug, Fahrzeug, Spielzeug are all words that denote an
unspeciﬁed and unordered set of material things: ‘things
to sew with’, ‘things to move/drive’, ‘things to play
with’. The latter could, for example, be anything from a
game board to a teddy bear or a football or even a pen
with which a person ﬁddles during a boring meeting.3 In
this sense, Hahn’s use of Beiläuﬁgkeit and Heidegger’s
more precise deﬁnition of Zeug are fairly similar. Faced
with these translational issues, we fall back frequently on
the German term, but also use the English words inciden-
talness, casualness, or inconsequential, depending on the
context.
The varying fate of meaning in archaeology
Each of us has found her- or himself reﬂecting at various
times and in various ways on the archaeological tendency
to attribute meaning to all of the things we excavate, docu-
ment and study. This (over)emphasis on meaning rears its
head in many places. Post-processual archaeology of the
1980s and 1990s was concerned to counteract processual
archaeology’s propensity in the opposite direction—to
functionalize everything and discount attempts to access
meaning. The result was an obsessive attribution of deep
signiﬁcance to almost everything, often a complex sym-
bolic one: white limestone cliffs are supposed by virtue of
their colour to be a relevant factor in site locations (Boriç
2002); simple lines of pottery decorations point to speciﬁc
underlying social structures and meanings (Hodder 1982).
But do all things, regardless of how mundane, per-
ipheral, banal, have a meaning (cf. Olsen 2010, 84–7)?
More importantly, do all things embody similar levels or
intensities of meaning? Or, rather, are not levels of mean-
ings unstable, dynamic and context-dependent? Recent
currents in archaeology, such as new realism and
approaches based on object-oriented ontologies, once
again realign discussions about the relation between
humans and things (Edgeworth 2016; Olsen et al. 2012;
Witmore 2014). The paradigm shift away from a discourse-
and language-based philosophy, as promoted by Lacan,
Foucault, and Barthes, has led to a renewed focus on
materiality and a corresponding decline of interest in
meaning as a relation between humans and other beings
or things in general. New and speculative realism as well
as object-oriented ontologies belong to a widespread dis-
course, one central tendency of which is the decentring of
human beings. As a consequence, things and indeed the
world are rendered ﬂat; the split between human motiva-
tions and their outer appearance has been replaced by a
way of thinking that fuses subjects and objects into actants
and assemblages (Bennett 2010; DeLanda 2006; Hamilakis
& Jones 2017; Harman 2009). Interest in ‘meaning’ as a rela-
tion of human symbolic and practical-manipulative power
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transform into forces contributing to a coagulation or dis-
memberment of assemblages, released from human inten-
tions or humans as actors. Interestingly, the outcome of
this intellectual atmosphere in archaeology is a ‘democ-
racy’ of objects where any and every object seems to be
in need of fundamental ‘care’ (Olsen et al. 2012), where
the thing world can be called a ‘parliament’ (Latour
2004). In recent discussions, Ian Hodder has promoted
the concept of ‘entanglement’, which emphasizes the rele-
vance of almost everything to the constitution of our
lived worlds, although in a reworking of his initial book
on the subject he has pointed to the asymmetrical relations
he sees as typifying entanglement (Hodder 2016).
The concept of Beiläuﬁgkeit can contribute to a critique
of this supposed equality of things by insisting that rela-
tions between humans and things have highly variable
intensities and qualities. Our reﬂections represent an
attempt to open a space to discuss the conditions and pro-
cesses that are responsible for the variable status of things
in a world of objects. Is there a possibility for things/
people/other entities to have more or less ‘meaning’, rather
than either none or an unspeciﬁed full one? Does a poten-
tial for variable importance and sense of speciﬁc things
follow historical rhythms? On what or whom would such
an ebb and ﬂow of signiﬁcances depend?
Mapping Beiläuﬁgkeit
We suggest that the notion of Beiläuﬁgkeit offers a way to
address these issues, by shifting attention to that which is
physically present but not necessarily a focus of perception
or imbued with any particular signiﬁcance. Beiläuﬁg is that
which in a speciﬁc context fades into the background. For
Heidegger, this is the ready-to-hand that one does not
notice because it is simply there and fulﬁls a task; it is
the task that is the object of attention, what is hammered,
not the hammer itself (Heidegger [1927] 1962, 98). In
more contemporary terminology, one might say that this
kind of a beiläuﬁge use of tools or gestures is part of
embodied knowledge, a know-how that becomes sufﬁ-
ciently automatic as not to require conscious thought—
until or unless it is disrupted by a broken limb or a broken
hammer. This is a thing world upside down. The focus on
single things, whether grafﬁti, taxi cab doors, or museum
objects and their complex trajectories (e.g. Fuglerud &
Wainwright 2015; Savoy 2017), creates an exceptional
attention that does not correspond to daily routines in
which the thing world drowns in a sea of incidentalness.
Indeed, the incidental is the precondition for the ability
to perceive and direct affect.
Incidentalness as a general phenomenon remains dif-
ﬁcult to grasp and describe, elusive and ambiguous.
Everything that we are not aware of belongs to this sphere.
Our attention is focused ﬁrst on one thing, then on another,
constantly moving, so that only small attention-seeking
islands appear and disappear in a sea of incidentalness.
In archaeology, Beiläuﬁgkeit is also related to the use of par-
ticular media to depict and represent objects. These are
traditionally overwhelmingly visual. We do not pursue
here an exploration of the role of other senses in producing
incidentalness or its opposite, although this would be an
intriguing direction for future research.
Basing on our common-sense understanding of
Beiläuﬁgkeit, as well as attempts to think theoretically
through the concept and its implications, has led us to
emphasize the dynamic aspects of Beiläuﬁgkeit. Under
what circumstances do things become (more or less)
beiläuﬁg; when and how do they move out of that status?
A cautiously formulated result of these reﬂections
could be that a generalized, broad ‘Incidentalness’ with a
capital ‘I’ should be distinguished from concrete, historic-
ally manifest incidentalnesses. On the level of generalized
Beiläuﬁgkeit, deﬁnitional issues can be discussed as well
as the question of whether Incidentalness is characterized
by a fundamental ﬂuidity and ambiguity. On the other
hand, there are concrete historical incidentalnesses, cases
in speciﬁc and changing worlds that can be compared in
terms of their patterns and dynamics. In order to broach
these differences between the general Incidental and the
speciﬁc multiple cases, we have tried to systematize condi-
tions that inﬂuence the shaping and framing of
Beiläuﬁgkeiten. These are ﬁrst and foremost the traditional
ones of time and space.
Time and rhythm
Incidentalness is ﬂuid, characterized by a process of
constant re-focusing. It has a dynamic routine and its
own history. The incidental is an unquestioned element
of our life, but not an unquestionable sphere, and it should
not be conﬂated with a traditional deﬁnition of ‘lifeworld’
as the unquestioned and unquestionable (Habermas 1984,
70). Any element in a beiläuﬁge environment can be con-
sciously ‘zeroed in upon’, ﬁxed, and in the process changed
to a very different state, one of impressiveness or attentive-
ness. However, the material world also exerts its own
power over the potential of subjects to guide their attention
towards speciﬁc elements in their surroundings. The dia-
lectical relation between the ability to concentrate on
some things and the possibility to let go have their counter-
part in the orientational power of those very things. They
embody their own patterns of change, which may be
unique and directional or recursive and therefore to a cer-
tain extent foreseeable. We begin with several facets of dir-
ectional change.
A ﬁrst facet is growing up, which can be understood
as a learning process during which more and more aspects
of the world become incidental, or at least acquire the
potential to be so. Children have much less of a need or
a capacity for incidentalness and make distinctions
between the incidental and the focused much less system-
atically and less often than adults. In this way, Beiläuﬁgkeit
seems to be a fundamental phenomenon of socialization,
but the speciﬁc result—which elements of a world can be
pushed aside as incidental—is the outcome both of grow-
ing up in a particular culture and of personal sensibilities
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(cf. Benjamin [1987] 2006). These issues are of signiﬁcance
to an emerging archaeology of childhood and socialization
(e.g. Baxter 2008; Coskunsu 2016).
In the process of socialization, we learn about inci-
dentalness by getting used to inserting speciﬁc kinds of
things in speciﬁc frameworks. We learn, for example,
what a house looks like, or what things afford which con-
texts—e.g. forks in a kitchen—but also what is socially
acceptable and expected of us in particular locations.
These frameworks have their own complex multitemporal
structure: some elements reach far back in time and have
a strong power to anchor perceptions and experience
over the long term, inﬂuencing generations if not whole
epochs in their understanding of the world, e.g. architec-
tural traditions; others are only short in duration and
decay quickly, for example, the use of public telephones
and phone booths to call people when away from home.
Change comes through small alterations of practices.
We can de-incidentalize things by focusing on them and
their surroundings, something which often requires an ini-
tial call for attention. Consequently, incidentalness is nei-
ther inherent in objects or living beings, nor is it purely a
matter of individual perception or a broadly generalizable
relation between the two. Rather, incidentalness needs to
be understood as a culture-speciﬁc potential that underlies
the contingency of relations.
Second, the more we involve ourselves in a particular
environment, the easier it is to focus attention on highly
speciﬁc individual phenomena and by implication to
ignore everything else. Travel and the accompanying
experience of being a foreigner lead to a rapid lowering
of incidentalness. Where language, culture, food, clothing
and rituals are foreign, full attention is required to make
sense of one’s impressions and the relationships between
them. Non-incidentalness and the active, intensiﬁed search
for meaning are closely related. Conversely, the most basic
elements necessary for survival will, after a short time, tend
toward the casual even in foreign environments. They will
be primarily situated in the material world rather than in
linguistic and intellectual spheres and are therefore rele-
vant for any material studies.
Third, rites of passage produce an abrupt change in
the well-rehearsed world of the incidental, set in motion
through ritually structured processes. Since these are stages
in life through which other subjects also go, such
deep-running changes are predictable from an external per-
spective and in their objective consequences; they lead to a
shift in perceived identity. The required negotiation
between the new role and one’s surroundings entails a
re-socialization which is not in essence distinct from travel,
as parts of the changing environment have to be mastered
and condensed into a routine.
Fourth, certain historical circumstances can lead to an
expansion or narrowing of relations of incidentalness. A
secure, little-changing environment might tend towards a
fast spread of incidentalness at the expense of attentive-
ness, as dangers are minimized and awareness of contexts
is not required. Situations of threat, on the other hand, lead
to greater attention and therefore to a diminution of the
beiläuﬁge world. One can consider conditions in prisons,
in war or participation in a hunt as examples. Reports
about battleﬁelds by former soldiers suggest that in
violence-prone situations the world of inattentive routine
almost completely disappears and even the smallest every-
day objects, every movement or sound, take on extraordin-
ary relevance. Not without grave consequences. Walter
Benjamin noted that the experience of extreme violence in
the First World War ended with a society-wide loss of
the capacity for experience (Jay 1999/2000).
Such non-recursive temporal frames of Beiläuﬁgkeit
include varying degrees of unforeseeability. In contrast,
repetitive events have their own position in incidental
worlds. In this realm, it is useful to distinguish quotidian
from exceptional recursivity.
Quotidian recursive temporalities and incidentalness
reinforce each other. Cyclical occurrences mesh with
daily, weekly, or seasonal habits. They bring with them
sets of experiences that spur expectations, often including
expectations about the framing of speciﬁc events
(Koselleck 2004, 255–75). Time and space fuse, making a
crowding-out and forgetting of the spatio-temporal back-
stage world relatively easy.
In contrast to such quotidian recursiveness are excep-
tional occurrences such as rituals (for deﬁnition, see
Kertzer 1988 and Bell 1992). Often set into transcendentally
anchored complex religious dogma or political staging,
they capture our full attention when they are able to mobil-
ize a host of elements that frame our lives, from move-
ments (processions) to smells, tastes, the audible, or gift
giving. One could even propose that successful rituals are
those that temporally abrogate a maximum amount of
incidentalness.
Both quotidian and ritual temporalities are part of
experienced and remembered time (Rosa 2010). Time ﬁlled
with special or exciting encounters passes very quickly.
Conversely, the same amount of time spent with everyday,
repetitive activities feels as though it goes by very slowly.
This perception of experienced time is often inversely pro-
portional to remembered time. Extraordinary moments
remain in one’s memory long after, while the boring ones
are perceived as beiläuﬁg, unimportant, and coalesce into
an undifferentiated mass in one’s memory. This multitem-
poral aspect of Beiläuﬁgkeit could, in Rosa’s sense, be an
effect of the relationship between experience and memory
and also an expression of feelings of social acceleration
and slowing down.
Space
Incidentalness is supported by spatial conditions. We dis-
tinguish two fundamentally different approaches to the
relation between space and the incidental. Some authors
start from a subjectivist notion of incidentalness and
describe it as driven by perception, while others analyse
the incidental as a mise-en-scène or framing.
Heidegger’s attempt to describe a room and its per-
ception in his chapter on Zeug and Zuhandenheit in Being
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the perspective of a subject. The ready-to-hand is by deﬁn-
ition ‘in its place’ and includes—according to Heidegger—
a speciﬁc nearness and directionality (Verweisung).4 One
might formulate this, following Mary Douglas, by saying
that the incidental is matter in place (Douglas 1984, 36–41).
Still, in Heidegger’s philosophy, things do not only pas-
sively hold a place, but act, since he describes them as
‘retreating’, stepping away into a ‘veiled underworld’
(see also Harman’s 2002 rereading). The consequence is
that a particular spatial or relational distribution of objects
can be experienced as unproblematic, unperceived, we
might say ‘normal’.
Miller expresses the speciﬁc actions of things as their
‘humility’ (Miller 1987, 85–108) and mentions monumen-
tality as (one of) the opposites of such a quality.
Engagements with thing worlds often start from this
opposing end and question why and how people perceive
particular things as possessing an enhanced rather than an
unobtrusive and low-key position. Another good example
is Walter Benjamin’s engagement with aura. Benjamin
(1968) takes a person as the starting point, and the focus
is placed squarely on that which attracts and enchants,
that which is not incidental. Underlying these approaches
is the conviction that incidentalness and attentiveness are
an antagonistic pair. Typical for this paradigmatic choice
is Miller’s (1987) term objectiﬁcation: the world is under-
stood as a conﬁguration of entities exterior to a subject.
This point leads us to a brief aside: Does this mean
that a world where things consist of a mix of what we trad-
itionally consider lifeless objects and living beings would
not differentiate between the incidental and the attention-
commanding? The question has regained renewed
attraction with the ontological turn and questioning of the
affective qualities of relations between things, rather than
just between people and things. A non-anthropocentric
view may help us to think more generally through ques-
tions concerning the quality and quantity of relationships.5
Rather than being an epistemological mode of human
perception and evaluation of relations, Beiläuﬁgkeit might
be understood as an ontological relation. Is Beiläuﬁgkeit
then a quality or mode of interaction between entities,
one that is undirected, random and unrepeatable? With
what other humans and non-humans do things come into
contact? Or is it rather the externalized result of a process
of territorialization of an assemblage (DeLanda 2006,
12–13), an unstable, boundary-drawing process of a
‘subject-less self-referring entity that captures different
actions into the same ﬂow’ (Normark 2010, 168; see also
Schreiber 2018, 113–14)? These questions would not be
answered in the same way by each of the authors of this
paper.
Let us return to the previous argument and turn the
logic around to consider the spatialities of incidentalness
as a matter of subjectivation. Here, incidentalness is not in
the eye of the beholder or the potentially changeable inter-
est of a person, but is rather determined to a certain extent
by spatial conditions. Erving Goffman’s (1986) concept of
frame analysis is a useful starting point, although his
approach is situated in intersubjective and discursive
realms, whereas our concern is with material framing.
Goffman’s ideas of social life as framed make reference to
theatre as an underlying metaphor: actions are carried
out on a stage that has scenery and a setting.
Such framing is, we propose, an organizer of inciden-
talness. A speciﬁc material setting draws attention to par-
ticular things while deﬂecting from others (Butler 2009).
It dissects an endless attention-seeking world into entities
that gravitate towards speciﬁc relations and practices.
Umberto Eco takes from Goffman the example of a person6
and a mirror (Eco 1994, 105). At a hairdresser’s a person
inspects the mirror for its decorated frame rather than to
adjust their hair. The same mirror is sold in an antique
shop, and a person stands in front of it adjusting their
hair rather than examining the frame. The point is the mir-
ror’s context, which emphasizes some of its qualities and
pushes others into a stage-like background. When these
culturally ﬁxed expectations are not followed, the scene is
perceived as inappropriate. Put differently, Beiläuﬁgkeit,
attentiveness and speciﬁc rules that relate them need to
be considered as a set of connections that is constantly
reproduced through material practices in daily life. On a
broader level, frame theory could lead to an investigation
of the relation between material frames and expectations
for practices. Both can to some extent be materially mani-
fest, and in such cases, the diversion from these expecta-
tions could give us a sense of how people in the past
dealt with the incidental. In our workshop discussions,
Shannon Dawdy referred to the concept of facilitators,
things that were made to be incidental; we may think of
a computer mouse or paper coffee cups. Other things
may become that way, despite different original intentions.
How does Beiläuﬁgkeit challenge archaeological practice?
Archaeologists often study pre-modern worlds. These are
frequently reconstructed as emptier than ours, bare of the
thousands of human-made things we surround ourselves
with and are surrounded by. Varying abundances of things
in speciﬁc locations and times may accord them a more or
less meaningful position, speciﬁcally in archaeological dis-
course. If we follow the idea of material framing as a stage
set that leads to speciﬁc forms of subjectivation and under-
standings of incidentalness, what does this imply for
pre-industrial times? Answers to this question are not
straightforward. Should we imagine that the whole issue
of incidentalness is a truly modern one, the outcome of a
world that drowns in things,7 so that a generalized
Incidentalness (with a capital ‘I’) cannot be posited at all?
Do material framings subjectivize people into fundamen-
tally different selves whose constitution deﬁes comparabil-
ity? Or does incidentalness lend itself to cross-cultural
comparisons? No matter how we approach thingly quan-
tities and their effects on framing, a basic issue for dealing
with Beiläuﬁgkeit in the deeper past surely must be a sort of
hermeneutic withdrawal from one’s own overﬂowing
thing-world.
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The issues of framing and staging also raise again the
question of whether all things have similar potentials to be
beiläuﬁg. Are speciﬁc kinds of things inherently more or
less likely to become or to remain beiläuﬁg? Or—and we
argue that this is more likely—is Beiläuﬁgkeit always a rela-
tion dependent on a staging of an object world, an emergent
property of the relationships between people and things,
rather than being somehow inherent in things?
Fundamentally, it seems to us that Beiläuﬁgkeit is much
more easily produced in a highly specialized world such
as ours, one that is ﬁlled with stuff and in which the object
world is at least in part separated from personal culture,
than in a materially frugal, less specialized realm. This
rests more on the recognition (or lack thereof) of the work
that goes into making things than on a simple issue of quan-
tity (cf. Fowles 2010). Incidentalness is related to knowledge
and/or visibility of labour, drudgery and skill in the making
of a material world, even if indirectly. When we are not con-
fronted with or do not make the effort to see the labour
entailed in making the clothing we wear, the computers
on which we write our papers and through which much
of our communication takes place, or the ‘cleansing’ of inter-
net content performed by workers in the Philippines, this
inattention contributes to the making of incidentalness.
How research changes the object of study
Archaeology is a discipline that is quintessentially opposed
to Beiläuﬁgkeit, as we search almost by deﬁnition for mean-
ing in all material that captures our attention, even when
that meaning amounts to little more than functions of
things. But this is not a democratic process—we sort things
out according to our (often implicit) interests and ques-
tions, paying attention, for example, to chipped stone arte-
facts when they are found in Palaeolithic or Neolithic
contexts, but not when they occur in Bronze Age occupa-
tions. Our search for meaning takes place in two registers.
On the one hand, much effort goes into (more or less expli-
cit) reconstructions of the meanings of concrete things. On
the other hand, archaeology and its often frustratingly
unimaginative attempts at historiography are part of a
whole apparatus of Sinnproduktion, ‘making sense of the
past’ as an orientation, however imprecise, for the future
(e.g. Rüsen 1990). An archaeological ﬁeld project, article
or book that does not want to make sense of an issue, a
site, or a research problem is doomed to failure.
We note that the role of incidentalness is much more
easily grasped and analysed in a diachronic study,
whereas a synchronic search for the incidental in other
(past) cultures faces many more obstacles. It is a symptom
for the state of archaeology, a discipline that cannot relin-
quish things and let them return to their ‘humble’ past
contexts where they perhaps did not have an overly
important place, where they were just the casual object
next door. We are left with the question of how we can
extract from our evidential record hints at the varying
potential for incidentalization of past things or enchainments
of things.
We are not the ﬁrst to note one of the paradoxes of
research on Beiläuﬁgkeit: when training the spotlight on a
concrete incidental thing, we automatically—per deﬁn-
ition—take this very thing on which we focus out of the
realm of the Beiläuﬁge. We archaeologists deal best with
incidentalness when we are off duty. While we are used
to destroying that which we investigate materially through
excavation, in this case the effect is located in the concep-
tual world. A study of Beiläuﬁgkeit is thereby invariably
part of the history of knowledge at its most complex—as
a developing diachronic relation.
What do we do with this paradox of automatically
destroying the very core of our interest? It has no real solu-
tion, but we see three possible ways of coping with it. The
ﬁrst is to abandon wholesale the issue of Beiläuﬁgkeit as
outside of academic investigation. Clearly, this is not a
direction we advocate. A second option is to study inciden-
talness not as it shapes up, but as a matter of memory. In
this case, we are confronted with personal anecdotes, a
way of thinking that is often the starting point of
philosophical treatises. We consider this insufﬁcient for
an anthropologically and politically engaged archaeology.
A third alternative is to attempt to objectivize the issue:
to study the things that were made to be incidental. In
the realm of material (or other) production, that means
investigating tools and their position in social life, since
they are material means that were used for other ends. In
terms of consumption, incidental things would be the
opposite of Latour’s (1999, 186) ‘sleeping policeman’, e.g.
man-hole covers, to stay with the example of the street.
These are things that hide, that do not disrupt, but that
still keep their agency. From that perspective, present and
past material elements for the production of incidentalness
might best be conceived as large-scale systems of
concealment.
One ﬁnal characteristic needs to be added to these
reﬂections on the incidental: its political import. The
world of Beiläuﬁgkeiten is political in complex and indirect
ways, ﬁrst, because that world appears to be the opposite
of anything political: the unperceived, irrelevant, casual,
peripheral. This very location below the radar renders inci-
dentalness so powerful. The unnoticed is unquestioned
and does not run the danger of being opposed.
The threshold that separates the non-incidental from
the casual, unperceived reality is deeply ideological. It
determines what we can capture with our senses, whether
through language, sight, acoustics, or otherwise. We follow
Rancière’s (2004) insight that perception is a cultural-
political process that cuts the world into speciﬁc parts
that for us come into existence through the senses. These
parts are continuously reproduced, modiﬁed, and some-
times abruptly changed.
The world of incidentalness has its own inner structure.
In archaeology, this structure has developed historically. We
attempt to democratize the Beiläuﬁgkeit potential of the
thingly world by claiming to take everything as important,
although we, too, sort (out), classify, and attribute meaning
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away from the threshold of imperceptibility. The papers that
follow provide important insights into the complex ﬁeld of
relations between people and things, divisions, processes
and emergent dynamics that remind us how much of the
world in which we live remains barely noticed, if not com-
pletely overlooked, yet deeply inﬂuential.
Notes
1. Heidegger ([1927] 1962, 95–122). We did so with many
reservations. Not all of us were willing to fully engage
with Heidegger’s work, as the inﬂuence on his phil-
osophy of his Nazi political leanings—which he nei-
ther denied nor renounced during his lifetime—
remains intensely disputed (see Scheit 2001).
2. The German noun is Beiläuﬁgkeit [incidentalness,
inconsequentialness]; the adjective is beiläuﬁg.
3. In the English translation of Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit,
Zeug is generally rendered as ‘equipment’; only in a
few places is the somewhat pejorative ‘stuff’ used
(Heidegger [1927] 1962, 97). Julian Thomas has sug-
gested the term ‘kit’.
4. Our understanding of Beiläuﬁgkeit differs in a funda-
mental way from Heidegger’s. His whole vocabulary
consists of substantives, such as das Hingehören or
das Zuhandene, dividing the world into static building
blocks that are set into relation to each other. We con-
sider incidentalness to occur mainly in the becoming,
rather than as static being.
5. One may note that the ontological turn has led to a
wave of anthropomorphization of the material
world, with the proclaimed refusal of anthropocen-
trism in many cases turned on its head.
6. A woman in the original.
7. A recent conference on the ‘massive accumulation of
things’ discussed these issues (Hofmann et al. 2016).
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Insigniﬁcance: On the Unobtrusiveness of Material Things
Julian Thomas
From inexhaustibility to non-appearance
In their introduction to the discussion of Beiläuﬁgkeit in
archaeology, Pollock, Bernbeck, Appel, Loy and Schreiber
build pleasingly on the theme of what Daniel Miller refers
to as the ‘humility’ of physical things (2010, 50). By this he
means that objects do not determine or prescribe the actions
of human beings, but mutely establish the circumstances
under which we operate, conditioning our expectations
of how to proceed. Things are often not conspicuously
meaningful, but unobtrusive or ‘hiding in plain sight’ and
bringing about unacknowledged effects (Alvis 2017, 212).
This state of affairs has been recognized by both the
phenomenological tradition and the more recent ‘new mate-
rialisms’, but what I want to suggest in this contribution is
that these perspectives implicitly indicate that things can
be ‘incidental’ in a variety of subtly different ways.
It is arguable that in the modern West a proper knowl-
edge of reality has come to be associated with a considered
and analytical inspection of things, stepping back from
physical engagement in order to achieve objectivity
(Dreyfus 1991, 45). It follows from this that knowledge
takes a form that is both explicit and composed of distinct
‘bits’, which have a self-evident signiﬁcance and can be
gradually accumulated to create a satisfactory understand-
ing of the whole (Johnson 2011, 765). However, an import-
ant critique of these ideas was developed within the
Romantic movement. From Herder and Schelling onwards,
it began to be argued that not all of life is fully conscious,
and that some experiences cannot be expressed in an unam-
biguous and particulate fashion, or even verbalized at all
(Berlin 2013, 115). No matter how closely we look at some-
thing, there is potentially always more to be seen and more
insights to be gained, and in this lies the wonder of creation.
But at the same time, the implication is that our knowledge
of the world will always be partial and incomplete. This
insight was developed within phenomenological thought.
For although Edmund Husserl initially hoped to strip
away the inessential paraphernalia of everyday life, in
order to isolate the core of pure experience, those who fol-
lowed him were often concerned with the everyday ‘natural
attitude’ that he had sought to set aside (Hintikka 1995, 88).
How and why do we pass over, and neglect, much of what
is closest to us? These later approaches were explicitly con-
cerned with non-appearance, how things fail to become dis-
crete objects of knowledge or withdraw from our attention.
Indeed, these perspectives recognize that only a small por-
tion of the understanding that we rely on in order to con-
duct our lives is acquired in any explicit manner. The
atomized ‘facts’ that the Western tradition deals in can be
identiﬁed as secondary and derived, rather than as the
grounding building-blocks of knowledge.
For Martin Heidegger, it is a mistake to imagine that
material things are isolated and self-supporting entities, or
that we can get closer to them by listing their outward
qualities or identifying their process of manufacture
(Heidegger 1971, 164). Famously, in Being and Time
(1962), Heidegger identiﬁes two distinct modes of engage-
ment between people and things. The Cartesian/Baconian
way of looking consciously and analytically at objects, as if
from a distance, places them in a mode of present-
at-handness. They are just there, to be observed as lumps
of matter. But this is a relatively unusual state of affairs,
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